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The main issue this research paper aims to tackle is whether incitement to hatred, independently 
of direct incitement to violence should amount to the actus reus of persecution as a crime 
against humanity. Before determining whether hate speech can be treated as an international 
crime, this article assesses theories and current international legal standards in the field of 
freedom of expression in order to identify the space for such a drastic intrusion into this 
freedom. The most significant justification for an international criminalisation of hate speech 
in certain contexts is that it enables large-scale discrimination and threatens basic human rights, 
including the right to life, of the targeted out-group. Current international criminalisation, as 
interpreted by the jurisprudence of the Yugoslavia and Rwanda tribunals, still shows an overly 
narrow approach, excluding much of the hate propaganda that plays a vital role in the enabling 
of mass crimes. This article concludes that systematic incitement to hatred should be treated as 
a form of persecution, regardless of a call to violence, when the inciter has knowledge of the 
fact that his words might contribute to the commission of grave crimes or large-scale 
discrimination against the targeted out-group and the denial of human rights of its members.   
 
Key words  




The notion that the transcendental humanitarian principles encompassed by international law 
should be adhered to in all circumstances, even during armed conflict, has been echoed in 
various periods throughout history.1 Nonetheless, historically the placing of obligations directly 
upon individuals in an international context had a narrow pedigree. Yet, the merge of elements 
                                                 
1 U.N.T.S, ‘Second International peace Conference, Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land’, 18 
October 1907, 632 
 
 2 
of conventional international criminal law together with modern approaches to the humanitarian 
law has resulted in a gradual shift.  Evidence of this can be observed in the major contemporary 
developments to the concept of Crimes Against Humanity (CAH). A definition of CAH was 
embodied in a uniform multilateral treaty with the introduction of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC)2 as certain prohibited acts ‘committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack 
directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.’3 The authoritative list 
of prohibited acts embraces two designated categories of CAH; the ‘murder-type’ which refers 
to mass atrocities against civilians and the ‘persecution-type’ which encompasses extreme 
discrimination against civilians.4  
 
Persecution is defined in the Oxford dictionary as ‘hostility and ill-treatment, especially because 
of race or political or religious beliefs; oppression.’5 Undoubtedly, persecution crimes are more 
contingent on the mental state of the offender. This is because CAH-persecution is an umbrella 
crime which requires the additional element of the specific intent to discriminate on prohibited 
grounds.6 In Krnojelac, the Appeals Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) upheld the Trial Chamber and noted that persecution as an offence, in 
addition to the general chapeau of all CAH, must be a culpable act or omission that denies a 
fundamental right which is prescribed by an international law or custom, which was carried out 
deliberately with that specific intention.7 Additionally, given that persecution is classified as a 
result-based crime,8 it is necessary that the action has a discriminatory effect on the victims.9 
This definition distinguishes the actus reus of persecution as a CAH and the rest of the 
prohibited acts.  
 
                                                 
2 David L. Nersessian, ‘Comparative Approaches to Punishing Hate: The Intersection of Genocide and Crimes 
against Humanity’, Stanford Journal International Law 24, no. 2 (2007): 221, 228  
3 U.N.G.A, ‘Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9, 17 July 1998, art. 7  
4 U.N.G.A, ‘Report of the International Law Commission’, 5th Session, Supp. no. 12, UN Doc A/1316, 29 July 
1950, 120 
5 Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. ‘Persecution’. 
6 David L. Nersessian, ‘Comparative Approaches to Punishing Hate: The Intersection of Genocide and Crimes 
against Humanity’, Stanford Journal International Law 24, no. 2 (2007): 221, 239  
7 Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. ICTY- IT-97-25-A, ICTY, Appeal Chamber, Judgement, 17 September 
2003: Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. ICTY- IT-97-25-T, ICTY, Trial Chamber, Judgement, 15 March 2002, 
143 
8 David L. Nersessian, ‘Comparative Approaches to Punishing Hate: The Intersection of Genocide and Crimes 
against Humanity’, Stanford Journal International Law 24, no. 2 (2007): 221, 242 
9 Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, Case No ICTR 97-32-I., ICTR, Trial Chamber, Judgement, 1 June 2000, 21 
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The Oxford dictionary defines ‘hate speech’ as ‘abusive or threatening speech or writing that 
expresses prejudice against a particular group, especially on the basis of race, religion, or sexual 
orientation.’10 Academic literature on the subject of hate speech has almost exclusively focused 
on direct and public incitement to commit genocide, disregarding altogether the issue hate 
speech contributing to CAH and other international crimes being committed.11 However, 
modern trends in recent case law have indicated that criminal liability could be attributed to 
speech which has caused the actus reus of other offences.12 Admittedly, these suppositions have 
caused a great deal of confusion, globally and nationally.13 This may be because despite the 
frequent use of the term ‘hate speech’, in the legal context or otherwise, there is no universally 
accepted definition.  
 
Debates regarding the banning of hate speech blatantly reflect the split between the U.S 
legislative approach and European law. As will be demonstrated in this paper, the European 
approach correspondingly triumphs within the international sphere. In fact, the 1960’s observed 
a worldwide acceptance of hate speech bans as embodied within international human rights 
treaties.14 These boundaries of freedom of speech epitomise and accentuate the prominence of 
the concept of universal human rights based on the philosophy that collectively human beings 
share a common destiny and depend on each other. They attempt to suppress hatred by 
identifying the circumstances and contribution that atrocity speech makes to its associated 
harm, whilst identifying the extent of demeanour that renders speech-mongers liable for such 
harm and subject to retribution.  
 
                                                 
10 Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. ‘Persecution’. 
11 Wibke K. Timmermann, ‘Counteracting Hate Speech as a Way of Preventing Genocidal Violence’, Genocide 
Studies and Prevention: An International Journal 3, no. 3 (2008): 353-374; Gregory S. Gordon, ‘Music and 
Genocide: Harmonizing Coherence, Freedom and Nonviolence in Incitement Law’, Santa Clara Law Review 50, 
no. 3 (2010) 607; Shannon Fyfe, ‘Tracking Hate Speech Acts as Incitement to Genocide in International Criminal 
Law’, Leiden Journal of International Law 30, no. 2 (2017) 523-548; Ines Peterson, ‘International Criminal 
Liability for Incitement and Hate Speech’ in Martin Böse, Michael Bohlander, André Klip and Otto Lagodny, 
Justice Without Borders Essays in Honour of Wolfgang Schombourg (Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2018) 335  
12 Prosecutor v. Vojislav Šešelj, Case No. MICT-16-99-A, ICTY, Appeal Chamber, Judgement, 11 April 2018, 
151 
13 Gregory S. Gordon, Atrocity speech Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017) 307; Gabriele Della Morte, 
‘De-Mediatizing the Media Case: Elements of a Critical Approach’, Journal of International Criminal Justice 3, 
no. 4 (2005): 1019, 1033  
14 Eric Heinze, ‘Wild-West Cowboys versus Cheese-Eating Surrender Monkeys: Some Problems in Comparative 
Approaches to Hate Speech’ in Extreme Speech and Democracy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2009) 182-
184 
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It should be borne in mind that hate speech can take several discrete forms. Yet, what is 
considered to be punishable as a CAH is the encouragement to take action, directed towards 
third parties, against members of a particular group.15 Notwithstanding extensive attempts to 
reach a static conclusion, lack of clarity remains as to whether pure hate speech without calling 
for an act of violence may constitute a liability for CAH-persecution. This is because incitement 
law has reached a crucial crossroads as jurisprudence expresses conflicting standpoints taken 
by the ad hoc war crime institutions; the ICTY and the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR).  
 
In part 2, this article will analyse the morality of expressive liberty and consider the balance 
between the right to freedom of expression and the abuse of another’s rights. The article will 
compare philosophical approaches in law and consider their impact on the decisions made by 
judges. Thereafter, in part 3 this article will evaluate the present attitudes to hate speech in both 
international and regional human rights instruments in light of the general protection of free 
speech and the prohibition of incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence. In part 4, this 
article will consider the merit of including incitement to hatred as a CAH of persecution. This 
will involve an analysis on the development of persecution as a CAH and the implications of 
incorporating hate speech as an actus reus for persecution, before finally considering the 
existing limitations on hate speech as a CAH.  
 
2. Morality and Expressive Liberty 
  
2.1.The Right to Freedom of Speech  
The concept of liberty is surrounded by paradoxes.16 Amongst these seemly contradictory 
propositions, is the notion that when people are increasingly disputing about freedoms and the 
fundamental rights, liberty in itself may in effect also be in retreat. The introduction of 
international and regional human rights instruments as well as other regulations and directives 
is, however, leading societies in a new direction. Such development will have repercussions on 
                                                 
15 Alon Harel, ‘Hate Speech and Comprehensive Forms of Life’ in Michael Herz and Peter Molnar’, The Content 
and Context of Hate Speech: Rethinking Regulation and Response (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
2012), 306 
16 Daniel Overgaauw, ‘The Paradoxes of Liberty: The Freedom Of Speech (Re-) Considered', Amsterdam law 
forum 2, no.1 (2009): 25 
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liberty in general and particularly, on freedom of expression, as this governs an area of human 
behaviour that involves a ‘multifarious complex of values.’17 Thus, it is vital, to consider and 
reconsider free speech and its underpinnings as well as its consequences.  
 
The notion of freedom of speech concerns itself with actions of expression addressed to a wide 
audience, conveying propositions or attitudes thought to have universal interest. However, this 
concept does not merely refer to dialogue and exchange of ideas which are classified as being 
neutral or friendly. In 1976, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) set the precedent 
of Handyside v. U.K., that the notion of ‘free expression’ also encompasses information which 
offends or shocks the state or a community thereof.18 Furthermore, in 1991 the ECtHR held in 
The Observer and The Guardian v. UK that the concept of free expression may incorporate 
information previously declared confidential due to security reasons, if other means of 
protecting security services arise that will not infringe upon such a right.19 The Court elaborated 
on the reduced possibilities for states to limit freedom of the press which is based on its right 
and duty to impart information and ideas on matters of public interest. The protection of 
journalists under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights however applies 
only when the journalist is ‘acting in good faith in order to provide accurate and reliable 
information in accordance with the ethics of journalism.’20 
 
First and foremost, free speech is necessary on a political basis as it motivates citizen 
participation in democracy.21 For example, the US model for freedom of speech, includes the 
precondition that the state remains neutral and protects public discourse as a sphere that remains 
equally open to all communities.22 Such an approach allows for a wider and more varied 
marketplace of ideas in society, contrasted with one body being responsible for the perception 
of the political landscape by the citizens of a particular state. In the latter situation, the exercise 
of other fundamental rights by citizens, such as the right to an effective vote, is diminished due 
                                                 
17 Fredrick Schauer, ‘Must Speech Be Special?’, Northwestern University Law Review 78, no. 5 (1984): 1284, 
306 
18 Handyside v. The United Kingdom, App. No. 5493/72, ECtHR, Judgment, 7 December 1976, 49 
19 The Observer and The Guardian v. United Kingdom, App. No. 13585/88, ECtHR, Judgment, 26 November 
1991, 68-69 
20 Fressoz and Roire v. France, App. No. 29183/95, ECtHR, Judgment, 21 January 1999, 54; Bergens Tidende 
and Others v. Norway, App. No. 26132/95, ECtHR, Judgment, 2 May 2000, 37 
21 Council of the European Union, ‘EU Human Rights Guidelines on Freedom of Expression Online and Offline’, 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS Council meeting Brussels, 12 May 2014, (Brussels: Press, 2014), 4. 
22 Robert Post, ‘Hate Speech’ in Ivan Hare and James Weinstein, Extreme Speech and Democracy, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009), 133. 
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to the lack of public discourse.23 This was considered in Abrams v. U.S. by dissenting Judge 
Justice Holmes who stated: 
 
good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of 
the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market... while that experiment is 
part of our system I think we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the 
expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death.24  
 
Justice Holmes suggested that whilst the freedom of expression is imperative to maintain the 
free trade of ideas, it must be regulated in order to prevent the expression of opinions that are 
considered immoral. Freedom of speech is also necessary for the development of an individual 
in terms of human autonomy and self-fulfilment.25 This is necessary as the welfare of 
individuals is profoundly reliant on the social environment they inhabit.26 Consequently, John 
Stuart Mill asserts that ‘the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is that it is 
robbing the human race; posterity as well as the existing generation; those who dissent from the 
opinion, still more than those who hold it.’27 This suggests the significance of having a liberal 
society is that one has a choice between opinions, which is ultimately vital to establish what is 
true or otherwise.  
 
 
2.2.What is Hate Speech? 
 
As reiterated by decisions rendered by national and international courts, the right of freedom of 
expression is not absolute.28 Rather it must be weighed against other values, such as 
                                                 
23 U.N.O.H.C.H.R, ‘CCPR General Comment No. 25: Article 25 (Participation in Public Affairs and the Right 
to Vote), The Right to Participate in Public Affairs, Voting Rights and the Right of Equal Access to Public 
Service’, 57th session, 12 July 1996, 12  
24 Abrams v. U.S. (1919) 250 U.S. 616, 630  
25 Council of the E.U., ‘EU Human Rights Guidelines on Freedom of Expression Online and Offline’, 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Council meeting Brussels, (Brussels: Press, 2014), 3 
26 Robert Mark Simpson, ‘Harm and Responsibility in Hate Speech’, (PhD thesis, Somerville College, 2013), 
16, 65 
27 John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, Liberty and Representative Government, (London: J-M- Dent & Sons Ltd, 
1910), 9  
28 Erwin Chemerinsky, ‘Content Neutrality as a Central Problem of Freedom of Speech: Problems in the Supreme 
Court's Application’, Southern California Law Review 74, no. 1 (2000): 49, 61; Prosecutor v. Ferdinand 
Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, Hassan Ngeze, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 28 
November 2007, 18  
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multicultural sensitivity, the rights of racial minorities, and the prevention of violence both 
domestically and internationally. However, in cases where the expression is unambiguously 
and purposefully a call to violence or any other similar unlawful action which has the effect of 
destroying, humiliating or dehumanising a specific community, the underlying justifications for 
free speech are absent.29 Instead, the right would be misused in order to destroy what it is meant 
to promote and protect in the first place and would amount to hate speech.  
 
Some judicial opinions distinguish between hate speech as such and speech that incites to 
violence not necessarily finding the former outside of the protected freedom of expression.30 
Various scholars have argued that a wide definition of proscribed speech is more appropriate 
as it covers speech which is offensive regardless of whether it leads to more harmful results.31 
An extensive spectrum would cover from the mildest form, meaning the expression of 
animosity against individuals or groups based on national or ethnic origins, race and sexual 
orientation inter alia to the harsher action of inciting third parties to violence. Messages which 
encourage action towards the victim group can be either towards a non-violent or a violent act. 
The former category can be further sub-categorised into incitement; to hatred, to discrimination 
and to persecution. The latter is the most relevant in this context. It refers to the advocacy used 
to exclude a particular group from enjoying their civil rights in a comprehensive way. Thus, 
incitement to persecution refers to speech which inflicts discrimination on a broader and more 
systematic scale.32  
 
Influenced by this categorisation, several international and regional bodies have adopted a 
comprehensive definition. The Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers defined proscribed 
hate speech in 1997 as encompassing:  
 
all forms of expression which spread, incite, promote or justify racial hatred, xenophobia, 
anti-Semitism or other forms of hatred based on intolerance, including intolerance expressed 
                                                 
29 Robert Mark Simpson, ‘Harm and Responsibility in Hate Speech’, (PhD thesis, Somerville College, 2013), 
16, 63 
30 Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Trial Chamber, Judgement, 3 December 2003, 1000-06; 
Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, Case No ICTR 97-32-I., Trial Chamber, Judgement, 1 June 2000, 21 
31 Onder Bakircioglu, ‘Freedom of Expression and Hate Speech’, Tulsa Journal of Comparative and International 
Law 16, no. 1 (2008): 4; Jeremy Waldron, The Harm in Hate Speech, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Press, 2012), 107; Andrew Sellars, ‘Defining Hate Speech’, Boston University School of Law 16, no. 48 (2016): 
22 
32 Gregory S. Gordon, ‘Hate Speech and Persecution: A Contextual Approach’, Vanderbilt of Transnational Law 
46, no. 2 (2013): 304, 344  
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by aggressive nationalism and ethnocentrism, discrimination and hostility towards 
minorities, migrants and people of immigrant origin.33  
 
The implication is that hate speech may have several negative outcomes. Firstly, it may 
negatively affect people’s mind, thoughts and feelings.  Moreover, hate speech may also trigger 
physical injury, directly to persons or their property. Lastly, such speech may also cause what 
Robert Mark Simpson refers to as ‘status injury.’34  Therefore, restrictions and limitations must 
necessarily be in course of a subsequent enquiry of freedom and other competing rights.  
 
2.3. Moral Limitations on Expression  
 
Every facet of society is a result of the influence of particular cultural norms; cultural norms 
refer to attitudes and patterns of behaviour that are particular to a specific group, and thus 
indisputably influenced by morality. Since such norms evolve through time, the enforcement 
thereof which is conducted by an operation of the law, must intervene in the on-going process 
of historical development. Hence, laws are faced with the choice of whether to encourage or 
impede these evolutionary changes.35 Uncertainty, however, remains as to what extent criminal 
sanctions can be used to punish immoral conduct, such as hate speech. Philosophers seem to 
uphold divergent opinions and this research paper will consider the theories of legal moralism, 
Mill’s Harm principle, contemporary liberal theories and the critical race theory.  
 
Legal moralism advocates James Fitzjames Stephen and Lord Patrick Devlin sustain that law 
is not merely a tool to protect individuals from each other and induce necessary contributions 
to the public good, but also to make society moral for its own sake and consequently, immorality 
ought to be considered a crime.36 The premise of the Devlin model is that society is bound 
together by common moral values. Therefore, those who violate any of such values, threaten 
                                                 
33 Council of Europe, ‘Recommendation No. R (97) 20 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on 
“Hate Speech”, Joint statement of the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the OAS 
OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media and the OAS Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression’, 
607th meeting, 30 October 1997, 107. This definition was referred to by the European Court of Human rights in 
Gündüz v. Turkey, App. no. 35071/97, ECtHR, Judgment, 4 December 2003, 43, 22 
34 Robert Mark Simpson, ‘Harm and Responsibility in Hate Speech’, (PhD thesis, Somerville College, 2013), 
16, 73  
35 Robert C. Post ‘Law and Cultural Conflict’, Chicago-Kent Law Review 78, no. 2 (2003): 485, 491 
36 John Kultgen, ‘The Justification of Legal Moralism’, University of Arkansas Press 13, no. 2 (1985): 123,131 
 9 
and undermine society in a way that is equivalent to treason.37 Consequently, laws should 
enforce antecedent and stable values.  He asserts that the ‘law is an instrument to be used by 
society, and the decision about what particular cases it should be used in is essentially a practical 
one.’38 However, Devlin then refers to a set of general statements of principle, which according 
to him must be regarded when enacting laws enforcing morals. These include the understanding 
of maximum individual freedom consistent with the integrity of society, the concept that in any 
matter of morality the law should be slow to act and most prominently, the notion that as far as 
possible privacy is to be respected.39 These factors are to be considered when determining the 
boundary between criminal and moral law. This is because according to Devlin, it is impossible 
to set conjectural limits to the power of the state to legislate against immorality. 
 
Conversely, John Stuart Mill and H.L.A Hart argue that immorality should not be considered a 
crime and therefore not be subject to legislative restrictions,40 unless this results in harm to 
others without justifiable cause.41 However, Mill insisted that instigation would warrant 
punishment ‘only if an overt act has followed.’42 The harm principle has been incorporated into 
common law systems in regard to considering the balance of the autonomy of individuals 
against a legitimate intervention of rights by the state in order to prevent harm to society. In 
Keegstra,43 the Supreme Court of Canada upheld a conviction for inciting hatred after the 
appellant gave anti-semitic speeches whilst teaching. The majority agreed that the infringement 
of the right to freedom of expression was justified in order to protect society from hateful 
propaganda.44 This creates difficulty in considering what constitutes ‘harm’ and leaves the 
balance of such a concept to judicial creativity. 
 
                                                 
37 Jeffrie G. Murphy, Punishment and the Moral Emotions: Essays in Law, Morality, and Religion, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2015), 70  
38 Patrick Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965) quoting Home Office 
and Scottish Home Department, ‘Report Of The Committee On Homosexual Offences And Prostitution’, 
(Wolfenden Report) (1957) [England, Wales and Scotland], 13  
39 Patrick Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965) quoting Home Office 
and Scottish Home Department, ‘Report Of The Committee On Homosexual Offences And Prostitution’, 
(Wolfenden Report) (1957) [England, Wales and Scotland], 13 
40 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, (London: Longman, Roberts & Green, 1869), 51 
41 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, (London: Longman, Roberts & Green, 1869), 52 
42 Raphael Cohen-Almagor, ‘J.S. Mill's Boundaries of Freedom of Expression: A Critique’, Philosophy 92, no. 4 
(2017): 78. 
43 R. v. Keegstra, (1990) 3 R.C.S. 697 
44 R. v. Keegstra, (1990) 3 R.C.S. 697 p. 705(i) 
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Congruently, contemporary liberal theorists such as Joel Feinberg,45 claim that it is not a lawful 
function of the state to prohibit certain behaviour on the grounds that it might be considered 
immoral. This division between the above theories primarily arises as a result of the dichotomy 
on whether a ‘principled line,’46 can be drawn between the reasons that a state presents to justify 
coercive constraints on certain behaviour. Needless to say, there are two distinct thoughts on 
what are considered to be the correct boundaries. The liberal perspective was heavily influenced 
by the Wolfenden Report, the Committee on Homosexual Offenses and Prostitution, which laid 
down the function of criminal law and highlighted that ‘it is not the duty of the law to concern 
itself with immorality as such.’47 This statement raises the question as to why does the law then 
protect citizens against injury and indecency inter alia. The logical answer suggests that the 
law condemns such actions because such misconduct is immoral and harmful. However, not 
every set back may be considered as such. Rather, the liberal school of thought suggests that 
some parts of morality may indeed be enforced by law, whilst others may not. Consequently, 
the question that follows is which parts of morality may not be enforced. Feinberg asserts that 
what must be enforced is the protection of autonomy and equal respect for persons.48 This 
reflects Mill’s harm principle, which suggests that ‘if anyone does an act hurtful to others, there 
is a prima facie case for punishing him by law.’49 
 
Contemporary legal opinion is similarly divided with regards to the constitutionality of various 
statutes, that forbid conduct based on the alleged right of the state to enforce moral views. In 
an open society, citizens should have the opportunity to express themselves even if they are 
wrong. To allude that freedom of expression is cardinal to an open society is not to say that 
expression should be unlimited. Liberty itself must be regulated in order to be effective and the 
extent to which boundaries are placed upon liberty are determined by the governing bodies of 
a particular state. Ultimately, what defines the boundaries of freedom of speech is the strength 
                                                 
45 Joel Feinberg, ‘Harmless Wrongdoing’ in The Moral Limits Of The Criminal Law: Volume 4 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1988), 175  
46 Gerald Dworkin, ‘Devlin Was Right: Law and the Enforcement of Morality’, William & Mary Law Review 40, 
no. 3 (1999): 926, 928  
47 Patrick Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965), 131 quoting Home 
Office and Scottish Home Department, ‘Report of The Committee On Homosexual Offences And Prostitution’, 
(Wolfenden Report) (1957) [England, Wales and Scotland], 257 
48 Joel Feinberg, ‘Harmless Wrongdoing’ in The Moral Limits Of The Criminal Law: Volume 4 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1988), 175 
49 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, (London: Longman, Roberts & Green, 1869), 14  
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of society.50 It would, therefore, follow that, the wider the discourse, the stronger the society. 
As Daniel Overgaaw argued, the institution of strict laws on free speech is not so much an 
expression of civility, but rather a symptom of society in decline.51 Indeed, not only do 
individuals exposed to hate speech suffer a loss of dignity, self-esteem and sense of belonging 
to the community, but the targeted group also suffers estrangement from society, a loss of 
cultural identity, and group reputation.  
Critical Race Theory similarly highlights the harms of hate speech and the need for its 
restriction, specifically in the context of targeting minorities. It perceives society as a 
system which was built and developed to allow for white privilege in all spheres of life 
against people of colour and other minorities. The theory claims that equality of speech 
cannot exist in such a system and therefore the notion of a marketplace of ideas is not 
viable. Richard Delgado, one of its most prominent writers on freedom of expression, thus put 
the First Amendment openly into question.52 Several other thinkers have examined the capacity 
of speech to perpetuate oppression and have argued that First Amendment principles need to be 
qualified in light of that capacity.53 In other words, seeking to protect the values of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, i.e. equality, from those of the First, critical race theorists have argued 
for hate speech codes. Mari Matsuda suggested the creation of a legal doctrine to limit hate 
speech in cases where a) it communicated a message of racial inferiority against b) a historically 
oppressed group in c) an intentionally persecutory, degrading and hateful way.54  
 
The efforts of reforming the law along the lines of these moral principles however suffered 
a setback at the Supreme Court in 1992 in the case R.A.V. v St. Paul which considered a city 
ordinance criminalising the placing of a burning cross or swastika anywhere in an attempt to 
arouse anger or alarm on the basis of race, colour, creed, or religion. The City of St. Paul and 
Justice Scalia adopted the language of critical race theorists, stating that motives of restricting 
hate speech include the intent to ‘protect against the victimization of a person or persons who 
are particularly vulnerable because of their membership in a group that historically has been 
                                                 
50 Daniel Overgaaw, ‘The Paradoxes of Liberty: The Freedom of Speech (Re-) Considered', Amsterdam Law 
Forum 2, no.1 (2009), 25 
51 Daniel Overgaaw, ‘The Paradoxes of Liberty: The Freedom of Speech (Re-) Considered', Amsterdam Law 
Forum 2, no.1 (2009), 25 
52 Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, ‘First Amendment Formalism is giving Way to First Amendment Legal 
Realism’, Harvard Civil Rights and Civil Liberties law Review 29, no. 1 (1994): 173. 
53 Mari J. Matsuda et al. Words That Wound: Critical Race Theory, Assaultive Speech, and the First 
Amendment, (Colarado: Westview Press, 1993). 151. 
54 Ibid.  
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discriminated against,’ and the belief that ‘only where the bias-motivated aspects of the conduct 
is explicitly addressed can dialogue start that will lead to reconciliation and peace among 
communities.’55 The majority nevertheless struck down the ordinance. However, more recently 
in their book ‘Must We Defend Nazis?’ Delgado and Stefancic cite a 2003 Supreme Court 
affirmative action case, Grutter v Bollinger in the belief that this case gives grounds for their 
proposal for affirmative action speech codes for minorities to level the playing field.56 
 
2.4. Liability threshold  
Many of the outcomes associated with hate speech are consequences which hate speech 
contributes to, without being strictly necessary for their occurrence. In most cases, atrocity 
speech requires a causal connection with its harmful effects in order to establish liability. A 
distinction must necessarily be made between genuine harmful outcomes and sub-negative 
experiences i.e. annoyance or disappointment.57 Depending on the interpretation of hate speech 
adopted by the society in question, some consequence would render a person prosecutable. 
Once the causal relations have been identified, what must be determined is under which 
circumstances are hate-speakers held responsible and answerable for the subsequent harm that 
arises.  
 
Hart in his work ‘Acts of Will and Responsibility’,58 distinguishes between four classes of 
responsibility; casual responsibility, capacity-responsibility, liability-responsibility and rule-
responsibility. If causal responsibility applies, the question remains as to what are the 
circumstances under which such responsibility can be attributed.  
 
Notwithstanding the outcomes of factual causation, the perpetrator might be deemed liable or 
released from liability following the determination of legal (proximate) cause. Proximate cause 
refers to the cause which the law admits to be the primary cause of injury.  This may not be the 
initial event that sets in motion a sequence of events that led to an injury, and it may neither be 
the very last event before the actual harm occurs. However, it is an action that produces 
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foreseeable consequences without intervention from anyone else.59 This denotes that it must be 
proven that without such proximate cause, the harm would not have ensued. However, there 
may be instances where the connecting factor between the putative cause and the outcome is 
interrupted by an interfering, voluntary action of another agent. When this inference does not 
constitute a simultaneous effect, then it is regarded that the temporally posterior action 
continues the proximate cause.60  
 
Applying this understanding of causation and liability to hate speech, liability attribution is 
complicated as in most cases, the harmful effects of animosity speech involve some form of 
analytic intervention; intellectual, emotional, doxastic or otherwise, on the part of the audience. 
Certainly, the content expressed by the hate-monger stimulates via perception to some extent 
the consciousness of the listener. However, the fact remains that individuals are themselves the 
originators of their beliefs and actions. Reference must be made to the definition of 
responsibility as expressed by Gardner, i.e. ‘the ability to explain oneself, to give an intelligible 
account of oneself, to answer for oneself, as a rational being.’61 Based on this rationale, Gardner 
argues that the law holds people responsible as such, by upholding the idea that people are 
agentially responsible.  
 
To some degree it seems prima facie credible that hate-mongers should not be held responsible 
for harms which arise as a result of the identity-prejudicial workings of society at large. Rather 
since society is made up of individuals who are influenced by hate speech, then they should 
remain accountable for how they are influenced. Alternatively, if such hate speech is not a mere 
influence but conditions people into identity-prejudicial attitudes, then the hate-monger ought 
to be the legitimate liability-bearer for the damage done. Albeit this conflict remains 
unresolved, the preferred approach in relation to atrocity speech has been the latter – the hate-
monger is believed to be liable for that harm which is endured in consequence of his speech. 
However, this entirely depends on whether such actions within the given context and given the 
expected reactions on the part of the utterer’s audience could have reasonably be expected to 
have harmful consequences on others.   
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2.5 Hate Speech from a Comparative Perspective 
 
Societies, influenced by historical accounts, tend to take diverging stands and adopt different 
regulations to respond to hate speech. As a result of World War II and the Holocaust, European 
laws tend to be more vigilant against the consequences of unleashed dialogue.62 On the other 
hand, motivated by the historical oppression on American colonies by the King of England, the 
U.S. categorically safeguards freedom of speech asserting that hate speech is the price society 
has to pay for such a right. Hence, this contrast between European and American measures 
should not be merely understood in terms of the necessity to maintain democratic legitimation, 
but also in terms of sustaining their respective community identity.63  
 
The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution stipulates that ‘Congress shall make no law […] 
abridging the freedom of speech.’64 In fact, the First Amendment pressures the state to be 
neutral with regards to the contrasting perspectives of competing communities. Referencing the 
landmark case of Cantwell v. Connecticut,65 Robert Post avers that the American philosophy 
hinges on the idea that these freedoms shield the development of dissimilar opinions and beliefs, 
from obstructions. This robust approach was aptly summarised by Judge Brennan in Texas v. 
Johnson, who argued that underlying principle of the First Amendment is that ‘the government 
may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive 
or disagreeable.’66 As rightly argued by Jim Whitman, norms of individualism seem to be 
deeply embedded within the U.S. model as American law is downplayed to allow ‘free and 
aggressive display of disrespect’ which reflects ‘the political constitution of [the American] 
form of egalitarian society.’67 Hence, the idea is that public discourse conflict over fundamental 
cultural values should be determined without legal interference. This American hostility 
towards state-enforcement measures stems from a narrow conception of ‘viewpoint 
neutrality’68 and the significance of fair play i.e. ensuring that different communities are not 
being denied equal treatment insofar as dialogue is concerned. Restrictions cannot apply to the 
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right to expression and public discourse merely on the rebuttal that such speech may cause 
future detriment. Rather under the U.S. framework, for hate speech to be prosecuted the 
stringent requirement of ‘substantive evil that arises far above public inconvenience, annoyance 
or unrest’69 is to be satisfied. Any other debauched speech remains unfettered as the nexus 
between such dialogue and its effects would be too attenuated to pass constitutional muster.  
Thus, the American civilian-libertarian ideal protects free speech to the extent that many might 
find disturbing. Indeed, the U.S. was the chief advocate against Article 20(2) of the ICCPR.70 
Consequentially, upon ratification of the Convention in 1992, the U.S. included a reservation 
which asserts that such provision ‘does not authorize or require legislation or other action by 
the United States that would restrict the right of free speech and association protected by the 
Constitution and laws of the United States.’71 The implication is that although the American 
Supreme Court may endorse domestic legislation as specified within the ICCPR, it is not 
obliged to do so. Accordingly, U.S. courts foist rigorous and heavily-codified burdens of 
justification on legislatures who urge the censorship of extreme speech. 
Hate speech bans outside the U.S. are likewise constrained by routine legislative checks and 
balances, but they are not exposed to onerous constitutional tests to the extent which hinders 
the development and enforcement of such restrictions in America. According to the ECHR, 
restrictions on freedom of expression must necessarily be prescribed by law. However, this does 
not suggest that hate speech prohibitions should be used as an instrument of political pressure 
by the authorities. In reality, this is contrary to the legislative and enforcement practice of many 
countries, but very few of these countries are willing to openly argue in favour of their ‘right’ 
to persecute pacific dissidents under the guise of the ban on hate speech. Much of EU hate 
speech regulations act as pragmatic balancers. Consideration is given to the havocs and dangers 
of hate speech as well as the repercussions of constraints of the freedom of expression.  
Whitman contends that contrary to the American perspective, European law ‘levels up’ by 
expanding ‘historically high-status norms throughout the population’ whereby the legal 
protection of dignity which was once guaranteed only to certain persons, now applies to 
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everybody – even minorities, prison inmates, etc. 72 Nonetheless, European hate speech bans 
have also been the subject of criticism. Post and Heinze remind how governmental regulations 
of public discourse can be potentially problematic in societies whose governmental and 
legislative legitimacies depend upon an open and transparent system of participatory 
democracy.73 However, the American attitude, where regardless of the consequences, there is 
no criminalization of public incitement as such, is also considered to be extreme.74  
3. The Impact of International and Regional Standards  
The core common standards of human rights for all peoples and all nations were primarily 
specified in the milestone document of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). 
Nevertheless, subsequent international and regional human rights instruments were created as 
to provide protection of the rights laid down in the former. Albeit treaties recognise that freedom 
of expression is intrinsically valuable for the healthy functioning of society, such right is not 
absolute.75 This implies that states may lawfully interfere with freedom of speech in certain 
delineated circumstances.76 This principle of criminalising hate speech was initially outlined in 
the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), 
however other widely-ratified international instruments nowadays echo this obligation. Hence, 
this paper proceeds to explore the various conditions for restricting the right to expressive 
assessed in the context of the main provisions in widely-ratified covenants and assessing the 
relevant case law of enforcement bodies, which suggests that realistically the U.S. latitudinarian 
attitude is pitted not merely against the contrasting approach in Europe but effectively the rest 
of the world.77 Most countries recognise that in a multicultural society, the diversity of cultural 
groups is to be appreciated and protected. Therefore, it might be argued that hate speech bans 
developed as a result of the deeper understanding of the role of the government in protecting 
and promoting egalitarianism. However, legislation that seeks to suppress hatred does not do 
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so because hate speech per se ought to be condemned. Rather because hatred when expressed 
in exceptional circumstances.78 But what are these circumstances?  
 
Traditionally, legislation condemned speech which intended to ‘bring into hatred and contempt 
the administration of justice’79 or defamatory discourse. But following a century of attempted 
genocides, bans have developed in a manner where expression of hatred directed towards 
specific groups on the basis of religion, race or ethnicity inter alia is condemned and punished. 
On an international plane, prevention of incitement to hatred has been explored in the context 
of human rights as well as international criminal law. From a human rights perspective, 
international human rights instruments particularly the Genocide Convention, CERD and the 
ICCPR impose a positive obligation on signatory states to prohibit incitement to hatred and 
ensure that its citizens do not engage in it. Moreover, an individual who believes that his rights 
have been violated is given redress by having the possibility to bring an action in court provided 
that the state in question is a signatory to the relevant convention. In such a way, the 
international law encourages states to adopt regulations that penalise hate speech when it incites 
criminal behaviour, however within certain limits. Indeed, certain jurisdictions respond to 
extreme speech with specially crafted legislation, whilst others employ broader-scope 
legislative instruments to police it. What is paramount when contemplating the sanctions 
imposed for violations of restrictions, is that as stressed by the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee states must give adequate importance to the principle of proportionality,80 by taking 
into account the nexus between the relevant statement and the risk of harm.  
 
3.1. International Human Rights Instruments   
 
The main international human rights instruments including prohibitions of certain incitements 
to hatred are the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD). In the case of the ICCPR, 
Article 20(2) imposes a duty on states parties to prohibit incitement to discrimination, hostility 
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or violence. The Human Rights Committee (HRC) of the ICCPR has derived from this duty the 
‘right to be free from or protected against incitement’, however this right cannot be invoked by 
a potential applicant against their state.81 In terms of ICERD, its Committee offers a more robust 
protection to the right to be free from racist incitement as States are to instigate a complete and 
proper criminal investigation into each incident that engages Article 4 of ICERD, however cases 
covered by the Committee need to have an element of racism and thus do not qualify when 
based solely on religion.82 
 
3.1.1. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(ICERD) 
 
Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 196583 and ratified by 181 states parties, 
the provisions of the ICERD are not merely the first to address animosity speech but also by 
far the most far-reaching. Consisting of an opening paragraph and three operative clauses, 
Article 4 ‘was the outcome of a difficult compromise after hours, and even days, of discussion, 
drafting and redrafting.’84 Under Art. 4, ‘States parties have not only to enact appropriate 
legislation but also to ensure that it is effectively enforced.’85 Aware that threats and acts of 
racial violence certainly lead to other such acts and generate an atmosphere of hostility, the 
Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (the CERD Committee), 
emphasised that ‘only immediate intervention can meet the obligations of effective response.’86 
 
Particularly, the provision references hate speech and hate crimes as it distinguishes between 
four different aspects of the hate speech to be prohibited (a) dissemination of ideas based on 
racial superiority, (b) dissemination of ideas based on racial hatred, (c) incitement to racial 
discrimination and (d) incitement to acts of racially motivated violence. Interestingly, Art. 4(c) 
of the ICERD calls for the prohibitions on public authorities or institutions promoting or inciting 
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racial discrimination, elucidating the particular evil of public officials and bodies engaging in 
racist activities.87 
As it stands today, the provisions condemn propaganda and societies that are founded on the 
notion of racial supremacism or that attempt to defend discrimination. Correspondingly, the 
provision obliges signatories to endorse ‘immediate and positive measures’ which aim to 
eliminate these forms of incitement and discrimination. The CERD Committee has interpreted 
this provision to be a mandatory obligation. Hence, states are bound not only to proscribe 
extreme speech but also to penalise such misconduct by adopting criminal law sanctions. These 
sanctions must also be enforced on public authorities or institutions which either incite racial 
discrimination or exemplify the unethical behaviour of public officials and bodies. For such 
reason, the CERD Committee has steadily criticised states parties for failing to abide by it. This 
is because discrimination requires instant intervention while acts of racial violence or threats 
thereof can indisputably lead to other crimes or generate an atmosphere of hostility.88  
Hence, to some extent Article 4 envisages broader obligations on member states than those 
specified in other international legal instruments, particularly the ICCPR. Nevertheless, several 
member states have ratified the ICERD subject to certain reservations on Article 4, meaning 
that the national application of its requirements is subject to the state’s own norms and views 
surrounding free speech and its prohibitions.  
Although the ICERD, by virtue of its particular emphasis on racial discrimination, does not 
consider free speech per se, all measures necessary to implement Article 4 must have ‘due 
regard’ for the ideals espoused by the UDHR and Article 5 of the ICERD. This was the clear 
language of the CERD Committee after the ruling of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) in the Case of Jersild v. Denmark, a case which appeared before the CERD Committee 
as well as the ECtHR.89 The CERD Committee affirmed that ‘the “due regard” clause of Article 
4 of the Convention requires due balancing of the right to protection from racial discrimination 
against the right to freedom of expression.’90  
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As for the mens rea requirement, the early official position of the CERD was that the extreme 
speech prohibitions as provided for in Article 4 ‘should be enforced regardless of the precise 
intentions of the person responsible for the alleged racist hate speech.’91 This position was 
subject to criticism and Amnesty International has requested the CERD Committee to ‘clarify 
that Article 4 (a) requires an intention to disseminate ideas that advocate racial hatred before 
that dissemination is punishable by law.’92 Notably, the CERD Committee was among the few 
monitoring bodies which welcomed the conviction of a television journalist by Danish Courts  
for aiding and abetting the dissemination of racists statements by racist extremists, although the 
purpose of the programme was merely to expose racism in Denmark.93 However, the ECtHR 
held that the conviction by the Danish Courts was a breach of the applicant’s right to freedom 
of expression due to the fact that the journalist lacked the purpose or intent of promoting racism 
but, on the contrary, tried to expose and analyse it. The ECtHR stated that: ‘An important factor 
on the Court’s evaluation will be whether the item in question, when considered as a whole, 
appeared from an objective point of view to have had as its purpose the propagation of racist 
views and ideas.’94  
Year 2013 witnessed a dramatic shift regarding the CERD Committee’s position on the question 
of mens rea in relation to Article 4. In its General Recommendation on racial hate speech and 
in a paragraph specifically dedicated to the crime of ‘incitement’ the Committee postulates that 
State parties should recognise as ‘important elements’ of this offence ‘the intention of the 
speaker and the imminent risk or likelihood that the conduct desired or intended by the speaker 
will result from the speech in question.95    
There is a consensus among the jurisprudence of the CERD Committee that the Convention 
does not require the criminal prosecution of all bigoted and offensive statements. In Zentralrat 
Deutscher Sinti und Roma v. Germany, for example, the Committee found no violation of the 
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Convention even though the State party had declined to prosecute statements that the 
Committee found to be “discriminatory, insulting and defamatory.”96  
As for cases related to incitement to hatred, the CERD Committee has made it clear that in order 
to constitute “incitement,” there must at least be a reasonable possibility that the statement could 
give rise to the prohibited discrimination.97 It is open to question whether the term “racial 
superiority” as provided for in Art. 4(a) of the ICERD encompasses statements of superiority 
on the basis of nationality or ethnicity. Hate speech that contains discrimination based on 
religious background is not covered by the ICERD though there are recent voices who advocate 
for its inclusion.   
 
3.1.2. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)  
Forming part of the International Bill of Human Rights, the ICCPR  binds its parties to respect 
the civil and political rights of individuals, including freedom of speech. All such rights are to 
be safeguarded without distinction as to sex, colour, race or religion but rather national or social 
origin, birth or other status and ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities are to be protected.98 
Reiterating the fundamental definition of free speech expressed in Article 19 UDHR, Article 
19(2) ICCPR defines the right as encompassing the “freedom to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in 
the form of art or through any other media of his choice.”99 However, the version in the ICCPR 
further adds to this provision by averring that the exercise of such rights implicates “special 
duties and responsibilities” and thus, when necessary “[f]or respect of the rights or reputation 
of others" or "[f]or the protection of national security or of public order (order public), or of 
public health or morals", may be "subject to certain restrictions".100  
  
Nonetheless, not all restriction may be invoked under this provision. Article 19(3) establishes 
a three-fold test that must be satisfied for restriction on free speech to be legitimate. 
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Accordingly, interference must be provided by law; for the protection of one of the legitimate 
interests listed; and necessary to protect that interest. Having asserted the right of free speech 
in Article 19, the ICCPR further limits its effects through the subsequent article. In particular, 
Article 20(2) sets a standard which is more radical than the limitation set out in Article 19(3)(b) 
and in different terms than the ICERD. This provision obliges states to prohibit by law liberal 
expression which advocates “national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to 
discrimination, hostility or violence”.101  
Article 20 concerns itself with the prohibition of ‘propaganda for war’ as well as ‘advocacy of 
national, racial or religious hatred’ and has thus been described as one of the strongest 
condemnations of hate speech.102 While it requires that such advocacy constitute ‘incitement to 
discrimination, hostility or violence’ it is hard to imagine a situation in which it would not do 
so.103 Thus the provision could be read as a broad restriction on hate speech. Importantly, 
however, the drafting history of Article 20(2) shows that suggestions for extending the 
provision to include for example ‘racial exclusiveness’ were rejected on the basis of a potential 
breach of freedom of expression.104 
Mendel concludes that the obligations of Article 20 (2) are either identical or extremely close 
to the permissions of Article 19(3).105 Indeed, diverging from the reasoning adopted in 
decisions such as JRT and WG v. Canada, the HRC in Ross v. Canada affirmed that Article 20 
may be considered as a lex specialis with regards to Article 19. This is because Article 19(3) 
and Article 20(2) are legally contiguous and such nexus cannot be overlooked, as restrictions 
must necessarily also derive from the principles established in Article 20(2).  
In the HRC assessment of the Faurisson v. France case, Evatt, Kretzmer and Klein wrote in a 
concurring opinion:  
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 [T]here may be circumstances in which the right of a person to be free 
from incitement to discrimination on grounds of race, religion or 
national origins cannot be fully protected by a narrow, explicit law on 
incitement that falls precisely within the boundaries of article 20, 
paragraph 2. This is the case where … statements that do not meet the 
strict legal criteria of incitement can be shown to constitute part of a 
pattern of incitement against a given racial, religious or national group, 
or where those interested in spreading hostility and hatred adopt 
sophisticated forms of speech that are not punishable under the law 
against racial incitement, even though their effect may be as pernicious 
as explicit incitement, if not more so.106 
 
Notwithstanding the prominence of international jurisprudence along with universal legal 
norms, these do not affect lawmakers and experts enforcing the law directly. For such reason, 
the UN attempts to systematise rules relating to hate speech as well as its incitement by issuing 
several recommendations. Differing from directives or regulations, the function of a 
recommendation is to offer guidance and to prepare legislation in member states.107 Thus, 
although recommendations are not biding and do not have legal force, they have a prominent 
political weight. Of direct concern to this paper, the UN Human Rights Council has recently 
approved the Rabat Action Plan,108 which contains vital recommendations for lawmakers when 
implementing legislation and policies concerning atrocity speech. Particularly, the Rabat Plan 
avows that following the aforementioned international standards, States should adopt 
legislation which directly prohibits incitement to hatred using the same terminology, and in 
harmonization with the balance established in Article 19 and Article 20 of the ICCPR.109  
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As for the mens rea requirement particularly within the text of Article 20(2) ICCPR, a study 
conducted by Jeroen Temperman on the travaux préparatoires of the ICCPR as well as 
independent experts and scholarly works reveals the following findings:  
- The travaux préparatoires is far from clear on the point of intent. 
- There is an emerging consensus that Article 20(2) requires strong degrees of mens rea, 
including at a minimum (1) the intent to advocate hatred, (2) the intent to target a 
specific group, and arguably also (3) an oblique intent or knowledge requirement in 
relation to the consequences of the incitement. 
- Lower standards of guilt such as ‘negligence’ and ‘recklessness’ are problematic from 
the perspective of freedom of speech.110  
The Rabat Plan of Action also supports an intent requirement in relation to the incitement 
offence: ‘Negligence or recklessness are not sufficient for an article 20 situations which requires 
“advocacy” and “incitement” rather than mere distribution or circulation. In this regard, it 
requires the activation of a triangular relationship between the object and subject of the speech 
as well as the audience.’111 Arguments in favour of a high threshold of men rea standard have 
been canvassed by a range of important players at the international level emphasising that ‘no 
one should be penalized for the dissemination of “hate speech” unless it has been shown that 
they did so with the intention of inciting discrimination, hostility or violence’.112 
 
3.2. Regional Human Rights Instruments  
Beginning with the enactment of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in 1950, 
the trend to elaborate regional standards was followed by the subsequent ratification of the 
American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) in 1967, and later the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) in 1981. These regional human rights legal instruments 
have been introduced in an effort to render the security of civil and political rights, as well as 
                                                 
110 Jeroen Temperman, Religious Hatred and International Law: The Prohibition of Incitement to Violence or 
Discrimination (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 213-14 
111 U.N.O.H.C.H.R, ‘Rabat Plan of Action on the Prohibition of Advocacy of national, Racial or Religious 
Hatred that Constitutes Incitement to Discrimination, Hostility or Violence’, 22nd session, UN Doc. 
A/HRC/22/17/Add.4, 11 January 2013, 6.  
112 Council of Europe, ‘Recommendation No. R (97) 20 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on 
“Hate Speech”, Joint statement of the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the OAS 
OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media and the OAS Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression’, 
607th meeting, 30 October 1997  
 25 
of economic, social and cultural rights, more effective. Notwithstanding such added protection, 
however, regional regulations fail to provide clarity on concerns, particularly as to what is 
considered criminal or otherwise, which were left undetermined in the regional instruments.  
3.2.1. European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
 
Undoubtedly, the most significant regional instrument for the purposes of this paper is the 
ECHR. Enacted as the result of the two world wars, the ECHR was the first comprehensive 
human rights treaty in the world, protecting a broad-spectrum of rights. Whilst there is no 
established formal hierarchy amongst the protected rights, jurisprudence is proof of the 
European ideal that freedom of expression is the overriding underpinning of democracy, and 
consequently essential for the general protection of the other rights and freedoms set out in the 
Convention.113 The right to freedom of speech is guaranteed in Article 10, which characterises 
the right as broad as to include almost every form of expressive activity. Indeed, this provision 
does not merely protect information and ideas which are favourably received but also those 
which may shock, offend or disturb society.114 Hence, albeit the right is most commonly 
assumed to refer to the right to impart information and ideas, recent case law has indicated that 
the right under Article 10 also encompasses the right to receive information.115  
 
Notwithstanding this capacious understanding, certain limitations are justifiable as freedom of 
expression is not deemed to be an absolute right.116 Consequently, state parties may legitimately 
enact prohibitions to protect other rights or overriding interests. This test detailing the nature of 
such limitations is outlined in Article 10(2) and has been applied austerely by the ECtHR. As 
per such test, free speech “may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or 
penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of 
national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, 
for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for 
preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority 
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and impartiality of the judiciary”.117 This qualification may be divided into a three-part 
criterion, requiring the limitation to be prescribed by law, constituting a legitimate aim and 
necessary in a democratic society.118 Such formulation of ‘prescribed by law’ suggests that the 
restriction may only be imposed if it is based on a previously established rule as it must be clear 
to the potential perpetrator to assume that his actions will be sanctioned. Moreover, such a 
restriction must obviously be imposed to safeguard any of the purposes listed in para. 2 of 
Article 10. The last criterion is perhaps the most crucial, as it refers to the concept of "margin 
of appreciation" and measures whether the governmental reaction is in accordance with their 
unique legal and cultural tradition to achieve the protection of the specific interest involved 
without flouting the ultimate objective and purpose of the ECHR.  
 
Hence, analogous to the international standards the ECHR places a primary obligation on state 
parties to protect the rights and liberties established therein,119 by adopting measures which 
satisfy the aforementioned test. This has been reiterated by the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) as early as 1976.120 The Convention does not prescribe any specific modalities 
but rather leaves the states free to safeguard the right in conformity with their respective 
domestic legal system and other influential circumstances. However, the ECtHR retains its role 
as an overseer and to give the ultimate ruling on whether the limitation imposed is reconcilable 
with expressive liberty as protected under Article 10.121  
 
Additionally, there are certain circumstances where speech does not even warrant protection in 
the first place. This kind of speech is defined in Article 17 of the same Convention as “to engage 
in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set 
forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the Convention.” 
Once the dialogue in question falls within this scope, there is no need for the restriction be 
justified under the terms established in Article 10(2). Hence, as observed in Norwood v. United 
Kingdom,122 once the action falls within the ambit of Article 17 it no longer enjoys the 
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protection afforded by Article 10. Predominantly, the ECtHR has mainly referred to Article 17 
in the milieu of racist speech cases, which subvert the core values of tolerance and non-
discrimination embedded in the Convention. Such decisions apply the theory of the paradox of 
tolerance: an absolute tolerance may lead to the tolerance of ideas promoting intolerance, and 
the latter could then destroy the tolerance.123  
 
The “abuse close” in Article 17 has been subject to criticism as ‘it allows a case to be struck 
out without examination of the merits’124, ‘undermines the admissibility of [any] complaints by 
hate speech offenders’125 and ‘has the effect of a guillotine’.126    
 
The jurisprudence of the Court has not produced a clear-cut test of which speech can be 
proscribed. For example in Sürek v. Turkey, where the impugned articles described Turkey as 
“the real terrorist” and as “the enemy”, the ECtHR argued that the public has the right ‘to be 
informed of a different perspective on the situation in south-east Turkey, irrespective of how 
unpalatable that perspective may be for them.’127 The Court concluded that the conviction and 
sentencing of the applicant were contrary to Article 10. Equally, in Karataş v. Turkey, the Court 
found that: 
even though some of the passages from the poems seem very aggressive in tone and to 
call for the use of violence … the fact that they were artistic in nature and of limited 
impact made them less a call to an uprising than an expression of deep distress in the 
face of a difficult political situation.128 
On the other hand in the Leroy v France129 case the ECtHR found that the conviction for 
complicity in condoning terrorism of a cartoonist in France was not disproportionate to the 
legitimate aim pursued. The cartoon represented the attack on the twin towers of the World 
Trade Centre, with the caption: “We have all dreamt of it... Hamas did it.” Despite recognizing 
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that the expression was artistic and that cartoons are by nature a social commentary aimed at 
exaggeration, distortion of reality, satire and provocation, the Court considered that in this 
case it went beyond mere criticism of American imperialism by supporting and glorifying the 
latter’s violent destruction and in the context in which it was issued was capable of stirring up 
violence. 
   
Since the ECHR does not include a provision dealing with extreme speech per se the ECtHR 
jurisprudence on such speech is unsurprisingly unpredictable. While sometimes cases are 
assessed on the merits employing Art. 10(2), at other times Article 17 is used to throw out the 
complaints. Furthermore, the Aksu case has established that incitement victims may employ 
Article 8 on respect to private life as a legal weapon against hateful incitement.130 There is also 
confusion regarding the neccessary mens rea in instances of prohibiting hate speech. While 
Article 17 requires intent in that it addresses activity aimed at the destruction of any of the 
rights and freedoms enshrined in the Convention,131 the jurisprudence on Art. 10(2) produced 
mixed results on the matter. In the Jersild and Lehideux and Isorni v. France intent was 
considered to be a necessary element, whereas in Leroy v. France and Fèret v Belgium it was 
regrettably considered irrelevant. The Court has also permitted highly problematic restrictions 
on political commentary and artistic expression, such as in the case of Leroy and on speech 
acts that may have been offensive but did not amount to 'incitement.'132 All these instances 
restrict freedom of expression beyond what is necessary and even beyond what is constructive 
in the quest for a peaceful coexistence and mutual understanding of different groups. 
Repression of the freedom to speak one's mind inevitably leads to resentment and even hatred 
which may not have been previously present.  
 
Importantly, the Court has found that for a State party to legitimately combat extreme speech, 
it is not required that the hate speech in question includes an express aim of inciting to violence 
or to particular criminal acts.133 Deliberately spreading hatred that amounts to 'incitement to 
discrimination' may be sufficient to incur criminal liability.134 
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3.2.2. The American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) 
The ACHR broadly qualifies the right of freedom of thought and expression under Article 13 
as the right to “seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds.” Such freedom is 
safeguarded by bans on censorship or any kind of indirect restrictions. Nonetheless, under the 
ACHR free speech is also not an absolute right. In fact, the paragraph 5 of the Article 13 
imposes a prohibition on  
 
‘Any propaganda of war and any advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that constitute 
incitements to lawless violence or to any other similar action against any person or group of 
persons on any grounds including those of race, color, religion, language, or national origin 
shall be considered as offenses punishable by law.’ 
 
Commenting on this provision, the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) at the Organization of American States in 
conformity with the above-discussed international and regional standards reiterated the 
importance of the restriction to be ‘provided by law, serve a legitimate aim as set out in 
international law and be necessary to achieve that aim.’135  
 
However, giving to the lack of Inter-American jurisprudence, unlike the equivalent provisions 
found in international treaties, the basic framework of hate speech under Article 13(5), have yet 
to be construed or developed in depth by the Inter-American Court.  
 
3.2.3. The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) 
 
Established in Article 9 of the ACHPR, the right to expressive liberty is subject to the other 
duties listed within the same Convention. Such duties aim to identify which speech falls outside 
the bounds of protected speech. Of particular importance to this debate is Article 28 which 
stresses that "every individual shall have the duty to respect and consider his fellow beings 
without discrimination, and to maintain relations aimed at promoting, safeguarding and 
reinforcing mutual respect and tolerance." The African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights 
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has shed light on the topic in the ground breaking judgement of Lohé Issa Konaté v Burkina 
Faso.136 This judgment was primarily concerned with whether the integral restrictions on free 
speech in the Information Law and Penal Code of Burkina Faso could be legitimately justified 
with reference to the ACHPR and the ICCPR. Hence, the Court was left t to decide whether 
these limitations were provided by law, served a legitimate purpose, and were necessary to 
attain a set objective. Undoubtedly, the restrictions were "provided by law" as they formed part 
of the Information Law and Penal Code. With regards to the legitimate purpose, the Court found 
that the only reason for limiting the right is to be ascertained from Article 27(2) which stipulates 
that rights "shall be exercised in respect of the rights of others, collective security, morality and 
common interest." However, Burkina Faso failed to prove the necessity of the restriction i.e. 
how the penalty of imprisonment was a compulsory limitation to protect the rights and 
reputations of the members of the judiciary. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the pertinent 
provisions of the Information Law and Penal Code were not compatible with Article 9 of the 
ACHPR and Article 19 of the ICCPR. This decision has had a considerable impact on the 
development of the right to freedom of expression in Africa, as it offers an authoritative 
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4. Incitement to Hatred as a CAH-Persecution  
 
Having analysed the present situation of the hate speech field, in light of the general protection 
of free speech and the limitations imposed the present section  deals with how subcategory of 
CAH-persecution became a vehicle through which hate speech, not explicitly calling for 
violence, can be prosecuted.  
 
4.1 . The development of Persecution as a CAH  
 
Although the origin of the offence of CAH can be traced back to World War I, it was a result 
of the Holocaust and Nazi crimes and was introduced in 1945 in the Nuremberg Charter. The 
definition in Article 6(c) of the Charter considered that CAH was made up of inhumane acts 
and persecution on discriminatory grounds.138 However, the Charter required what came to be 
known as the “war nexus” i.e. a CAH has to be linked with another principle crime in order to 
be prosecutable.139 Whilst this nexus was removed by the Control Council Law (CCL) 
No.10,140 it was reimposed as a jurisdictional requirement by the statutes of the ICTR and 
ICTY. Yet, possibly the most predominant development with regards to CAH was Article 7 of 
the Rome Statute of the ICC. This article delineated the main characteristics of CAH, namely 
the prerequisites of a "widespread and systematic attack against any civilian population"141 and 
expanded the scope of the offence.  
 
The introduction of Article 7 of the ICC Statute was particularly significant with regards to 
persecution. It refers to persecution as “intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights 
contrary to international law by reason of the identity of the group or collectively”142, which 
can be committed together with any other act mentioned in the article. Furthermore, it 
modernised the classes of people that may be subject to CAH-persecution by a “catch-all” 
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provision which includes discrimination on any grounds that are universally recognised as 
forbidden under international criminal law.  
 
Notwithstanding some evident overlap with genocide, persecution and genocide differ in that 
their legal elements as they protect different societal interests. Whereas genocide is a forthwith 
crime which aims to destroy groups, persecution is a results-based offence targeting 
discrimination against individuals on discriminatory grounds.143 Unlawful discrimination must 
necessarily be the offender's objective as a mere certainty that discrimination will occur or that 
his actions may have a discriminatory effect does not suffice. Although not an essential element 
of the crime of persecution, a discriminatory plan or policy may act as evidence to prove that 
the required intent existed at the time of the offence.144   
 
As will be set forth below, persecution was originally included as a CAH in the integral 
instruments of the International Military Tribunal (IMT). The boundaries of what constitutes 
persecution continued to expand by the interpretation of CCL No. 10 adopted by American 
judges in judgements such as United States v. Ernst von Weizaecker.145 Persecution charges 
were common in judgements concerning Nazi criminals’ however, contrary to genocide, up 
until this point there had not been a precise definition of persecution and its scope had not been 
developed. Albeit jurists such as M. Cherif Bassiouni and a commentary published by the 
International Law Commission provided important guidance, the creation of the ICTY and its 
decisions stimulated the refinement of CAH-persecution.  
 
The foundational requirements were initially introduced in Prosecutor v. Tadić;146 there must 
be the occurrence of a discriminatory act or omission based on any of the listed grounds such 
as race, religion or politics with the intent to impinge on one’s fundamental rights. Building on 
this, the Kupreškić Trial Chamber’s articulation of the elements of CAH-persecution was as 
follows;147apart from satisfying all the elements required to constitute a CAH as per the ICTR 
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statute, it must be a crime that denies a group, based on discriminatory grounds, its fundamental 
rights reaching the same gravity as all other misconducts. With respect to the mens rea, the 
Chamber established that the perpetrator must be aware of the context of his act.148 In 
formulating such four-part test, the court concluded that a narrow definition is incompliant with 
the customary international law and thus such offence may be a multitude of discriminatory 
acts, generally not a single act but a pattern of acts, ranging from attacks on general political, 
social and economic rights to direct attacks on people.149 In fact, building on such precedent in 
Prosecutor v. Brđanin150 the denial of the right to proper judicial process and medical care also 
constituted persecution.  
 
4.2 Hate Speech as an Actus Reus for Persecution  
 
The conventional belief is that atrocity speech law developed from the CAH conviction of Nazi 
newspaper editor Julius Streicher, and the acquittal of Chief Hans Fritzsche by the International 
Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg.151 Although Streicher was initially Hitler’s rival, their 
ideological affinities made them join forces and Streicher became a loyal lieutenant. In the 
judgement, the court concluded that his speeches and articles incited the Germans to active 
persecution on political and racial grounds against the Jews, which constitutes CAH.152 
Similarly, Fritzsche was accused of CAH-persecution as a result of broadcasts he hosted as 
head of the Radio Division of the Propaganda Ministry. In court, it was argued that these 
aroused passion in Germans which compelled them to commit atrocities. Yet, the Tribunal 
acquitted Fritzsche on account that his diatribes against the Jews did not directly urge 
persecution. Albeit the IMT did not explicitly identify the elements required for persecution to 
be considered as a crime against humanity, both judgements hinted that the Tribunal was 
inclined to convict the defendants guilty of CAH-persecution on the basis of the hateful 
expression when it was intentionally urging listeners to commit murders.  
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Contemporary case law indicates that both the ICTY and ICTR have echoed the same 
understanding; for persecution to be considered a CAH it requires ‘a gross or blatant denial, on 
discriminatory grounds, of a fundamental right, laid down in international customary or treaty 
law, reaching the same level of gravity’153 as the other conduct that constitutes CAH. This 
position has expressly been endorsed by the Ruggiu Trial Chamber154 which picked up on the 
pattern set in the Nuremberg judgements that hate speech could serve as the actus reus for 
CAH-persecution convictions. Referring to the Kupreškić judgement,155 the ICTR concluded 
that the atrocity words in the broadcasts in themselves attacked the victims and did not serve 
only as a medium of encouragement to perpetrate acts of violence independently from the 
words.156  
 
Addressing this point, the ICTY in Prosecutor v. Kordić et al 157 ruled otherwise and concluded 
that Dario Kordić could not be convicted for persecution as mere encouragement and promotion 
of hatred did not satisfy the actus reus test set in Kupreškić.158 In its ruling the court argued that 
it is essential that for the accused to be indicted under persecution, his acts must be crimes under 
international law at the time of commission. 159 Yet, this does not imply that the actus reus for 
persecution must be tied to any other crime listed in the Statute. Considering preceding cases, 
the Chamber observed that the acts usually consisted of physical assaults on victims and their 
property.160 Nonetheless, the court argued that persecution encompasses both bodily and mental 
harm that impinges on individual freedom.   
 
Disregarding this judgment and contradicting the pre-established jurisprudence161, the ICTR 
delivered an innovative decision whereby it criminalised hate-speech that constitutes incitement 
to racial discrimination but not incitement to violence through an expansive interpretation of 
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CAH-persecution. A landmark judgment is that of Prosecutor v. Nahimana, et al (Media 
Case)162 which dealt with the defendant’s responsibility for provocative radio broadcasts and 
newspaper articles. Referencing Streicher as a starting point for considering hate speech outside 
the context of violence as a basis for conviction,163 the Trial Chamber noted that unlike the 
crime of incitement which is characterised by intent, persecution is defined in terms of 
impact.164 Applying this test to the case in point, the Chamber argued that incitement to hatred 
is not a provocation to cause harm but rather the harm itself. Citing the position taken in 
Ruggiu,165 the Chamber asserted that it is evident that when animosity speech is aimed towards 
a population on discriminatory grounds, this reaches the same level of gravity as any other CAH 
and constitutes persecution as implied in Article 3(h) of the ICTR Statute 166 A recent attempt 
to answer this question was made by the Canadian Supreme Court in the immigration case of a 
Rwandan refugee Mugesera v. Canada.167 Analysing the split precedent set by the ad hoc 
tribunals, the court concluded that a speech could amount to CAH-persecution if a link can be 
demonstrated between the act and the attack i.e, the speech act must either further the attack or 
fit its pattern but need not constitute a vital part of it.168 However, the Trial Chamber in the 
Media Case, ignored the underlying reasoning went beyond the Ruggiu judgement. In the latter 
case, the Trial Chamber argued that the aim behind such discrimination had to be death and 
removal of the victims from society and to some extent from humanity itself.169 Hence, this 
judgement did not go as far as implied in Nahimana as it did not draw a distinction between 
encouraging racial hatred and speech promoting racial violence. In pronouncing the judgment 
in Nahimana the court sought to justify its verdict by labelling such speech as ‘a discriminatory 
form of aggression that destroys the dignity of those in the group under attack’170 which 
denigration may cause irreversible harm.171  
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Whilst affirming that speech targeting a civilian population on the basis of any discriminatory 
grounds infringes the fundamental human rights and thus constitutes “actual discrimination”,172 
the Appeals Chamber in the Media Case was not satisfied that such speech alone amounts to 
CAH-persecution. The underlying argument was that before violations to the rights to life, 
freedom and physical integrity can occur, other persons must intervene as speech cannot in 
itself kill, imprison or physically injure members of a particular group.173 Nonetheless the ICTR 
in its articulation of the judgement made a significant remark. Refraining from determining 
whether hate speech outside the genocidal context is in fact of the same level of gravity as the 
other CAH, the court explained that it is not necessary that every individual act amounting to 
persecution is of the same level of gravity; but rather the underlying acts should be considered 
cumulatively.174 Hence, it is the cumulative effect of the acts, which can be determined by the 
context in which that action takes place, that should correspond to the gravity of the conduct 
listed in Article 3 of the ICTR Statute.175 Furthermore, the ICTR contradicted the statement 
made by the ICTY in Kordić that the underlying acts of persecution must inevitably amount to 
crimes in international law. It is worthwhile to point out that judge Shahabuddeen in his 
dissenting opinion referred to the Ministries Case and noted that the acts which were considered 
to constitute prosecution did not involve violence but rather mistreatment.176  
 
Notably, both tribunals have completely an equally noteworthy judgement, which still holds 
weight today in relation to CAH-persecution law. The judgement delivered by the United States 
Nuremberg Military Tribunal dealt with a CAH-persecution charge against Press Chief Otto 
Dietrich.177 Dietrich, who was known as the ‘poisoned pen’, was charged with persecution 
based on speech activity which conditioned the public through his disseminated and 
inflammatory teachings,178despite not directly calling for violence. Dietrich’s persecution 
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conviction was not based on specific calls to engage in a particular action. Rather, as discussed 
by the judges, it was a ‘furnishing’ of ‘excuses and justifications’ to ‘subdue any doubts which 
might arise as to the justice of measures of racial persecution to which Jews were to be 
subjected.’179 Hence this case suggests that the notion that persecution as a CAH can be 
prosecuted outside the genocidal context, existed as early as 1949.  
 
A case tried by the ICTY dealing with persecution in war crimes, was that of the Serbian 
politician Vojislav Šešelj. The prosecution alleged that Šešelj directly committed certain 
crimes, particularly public incitement and denigration of the non-Serbian populations in 
speeches inciting hatred.180 The Trial Chamber once again missed an opportunity to clarify the 
status of incitement to hate speech as CAH-persecution outside the genocidal framework. The 
dissenting judge, Judge Lattanzi argued that Šešelj discourse on the expulsion of Croats, if taken 
separately from the further underlying acts of persecution, would amount to persecution due to 
the grave conflict context in which it was made.181 Yet, the Chamber by a majority argued that 
the scale and modus operandi of the speeches did not satisfy the standards established in Article 
5 of the ICTY Statute. Similarly, in the recent case of Prosecutor v. Ratko Mladić,182 the ICTY 
convicted Mladić of persecution inter alia, through which he contributed to achieving the 
common objective of permanently removing Muslims and Croats from the Serb-claimed 
territory. Echoing the test established in Kupreškić, the tribunal stated that although the 
underlying acts need not necessarily be a crime in international law, not every denial of human 
rights is serious enough to constitute a CAH.183 
 
Notwithstanding these recent pronouncements, in April 2018 the International Residual 
Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (MICT) Appeals Chamber184  overturned the decision of the 
ICTY and convicted Šešelj on the charge of instigation of CAH as well as on the charge of 
CAH-persecution per se, both for the same speech delivered at a rally in Hrtkovci on the 6th of 
May 1992. The finding of CAH-persecution in the case of the particular speech rested on two 
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findings, a) that said speech violated the right to security of the Croatians since Šešelj’s 
instigation of their forcible expulsion incited violence that violated this right b) and that said 
speech denigrated the Croatians of that town on the basis of their ethnicity, in violation of their 
right to respect for dignity as human beings.185 Thus the finding of commission of persecution 
as CAH was at least partly based on initially finding the same speech as instigating deportation, 
persecution (forcible displacement) and other inhumane acts (forcible transfer) as CAH. While 
mentioned in the judgment, the violation of the right to dignity does not seem to have been 
considered as standalone ground for a finding of CAH-persecution. Rather one can conclude 
that neither instigation nor CAH per se would have been established had the Chamber not 
considered that there was a causal link between that particular speech and the subsequent ethnic 
cleansing in that area.  
 
Pursuant to the approach adopted in the Media Case, Gregory S. Gordon186 concludes that an 
in-depth analysation of related case-law would suggest that hate speech not directly calling for 
action may indeed qualify as persecution. He argues that such a position would be logical as it 
follows the precedent set forth by the Nuremberg trials. Yet, this does not imply that any verbal 
conduct amounts to CAH-persecution. Moreover, it is unlikely that isolated or intermittent hate 
speech could be considered as satisfying the chapeau element of CAH. This is because a charge 
of a CAH presupposes that the speech is intentionally and knowledgeably uttered as part of a 
widespread and systematic attack against a civilian population.187 Thus, although the core 
characteristics of what classifies atrocity speech as a CAH are not clear cut, they can be 
identified on a case-by-case analysis as context is key.188 Conversely, Diane F. Orentlicher,189 
whilst appreciating the importance of the Media Case as a measure of justice, disagrees with 
the conclusion reached by the Appeals Chamber. Orentlicher argues that by convicting the 
defendants of CAH-persecution founded upon speech that constituted incitement to racial 
hatred but unaccompanied by violence, the ICTR departed from its jurisdiction.190 This is 
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because the Trial Chamber decision in the Media Case ignored the rationale behind Kordić and 
placed excessive reliance on Ruggiu, which downplayed and misconstrued the leading custom 
concerning incitement as a basis for the charge of CAH-persecution in the International Military 
Tribunal judgments.191 She further debates whether the decision for criminalizing hate speech 
as CAH-persecution without a direct call for action, has resulted in atrocity speech laws  being 
misused in a way that critical media is suppressed. Yet, Orentlicher concludes that although the 
Nahimana Trial Chamber’s arguments had compelling foundations as they reflect the poisonous 
power or animosity speech, a criminal trial is not an adequate opportunity to revise the law. 
 
4.3 Limitations on Hate Speech as a CAH-Persecution  
 
Historically in CAH offences, hate speech and mass atrocity have gone hand in hand, in view 
that the latter is not possible without the other.192 Yet, keen free speech advocates have 
consistently argued that hate speech not explicitly calling for violence as persecution should 
not be criminalised as it will impinge on freedom of expression. The importance of freedom of 
expression has also been recognised by the ad hoc tribunals. In Prosecutor v. Brđanin193 the 
ICTY emphasised that the media has the essential role of a watchdog in democratic societies 
due to the public’s right to receive information.194 Therefore, analogous to the laws advocated 
by international and regional standards, for hate speech to be prosecuted as persecution the 
misconduct must satisfy the pre-established conditions.   
 
The modern international legislation allows the prosecution of animosity speech but only if it 
satisfies the chapeau of a conscious widespread or systematic attack against a civilian 
population.195 This qualification is fundamental, else governments would exploit their power 
to criminalise perpetrators and impose unnecessary legal restrictions.196 In order to understand 
better what would render an individual liable, the features of widespread and systematic are to 
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be dissected as atrocity speech should not be view monolithically. This suggests that the act is 
not an isolated or sporadic event, but part of an extensive or regular practice of atrocities which 
either forms part of a governmental policy or are tolerated, condoned, or acquiesced in by a 
government or a de facto authority. Accordingly, Timmermann argues that incitement to hate 
speech should be recognised as a CAH-persecution, where it is utilised within a system of 
persecutory measures by the state or a similar powerful organization.197 In this context, it 
becomes relevant whether the hate-monger belongs to a minority group or the country's 
majority. In the case of the former, it is highly unlikely that hate speech satisfies these 
requirements and therefore the speaker will be exempted from criminalization as persecution.198 
Needless to say, such speech is not the kind of expression that the First Amendment or the 
ECHR199 seeks to protect. This is because vigorous free speech protections do not apply to the 
socio-political setting which exists in the context of CAH.  
 
As argued by Judge Meron, the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply 
because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable,200 as free speech is the overriding 
principle behind a democratic government. Yet, hate speech as a widespread and systematic 
attack on a group of people does not aim to promote collective democracy or self-actualization 
but is rather used to spur or justify violence.201 Empirically in persecution cases and the speech 
in question must be intimately linked to the attack. However, this formula might vary depending 
on the nature of the chapeau attack and the speech is evaluated on a case-by-case basis. As 
pointed out by Pocar, the stringent requirements for CAH warrants that offensive and 
disagreeable speech will most often not be a sufficient basis for a CAH-persecution 
conviction.202   
 
5. Conclusion  
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Free speech is essential for a free society. It is the essence of any change in societal structures 
as it allows for the challenge to entrenched attitudes and ideas. As such it is vital for any human 
progress and indispensable for the expansion of freedoms and human rights and the principles 
of democracy. It is furthermore essential for each individual’s ability to live a life true to his or 
her own findings, beliefs, emotions and political convictions, without fear of governmental or 
societal repression or discrimination. Without freedom of expression little is left of the freedom 
of thought. It is for these reasons that any exaggerated restriction on speech sends worrying 
signals to those who value democracy, freedom and the overall well-being of society. While 
such intrusions are on the rise and deserve the most severe of condemnations, they are not the 
focus of this paper. Rather this paper has sought to find in the existing law and principles on 
freedom of expression the theoretical basis for the criminalization of speech acts which destroy 
the very values enumerated above. That is, speech which serves to effectively deny the 
freedom, equality or even essential human rights such as the right to life to members of an out-
group, be it on the basis of their race, nationality, beliefs or any other such characteristic by 
which they self-identify or are identified by others. History is proof that large-scale human 
rights violations are impossible without prior and simultaneous verbal conditioning and 
encouragement of the population through elaborate propaganda. It has been recognized that 
expression inciting or promoting racial hatred, discrimination, violence and intolerance is 
harmful and it often accompanies or precedes crimes against humanity.203 A very recent report 
by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar reiterated that some of the 
extreme forms of hate speech, namely, the use of derogatory, discriminatory and exclusionary 
language against the Rohingya Muslim community amounts to the crime against humanity of 
persecution.204  
Perhaps the biggest concern regarding criminalization of such speech acts is that clear cut rules 
are hard to set in advance and there is a need for case by case analysis which threatens the 
nullum crimen sine lege principle, yet the alternative would be to neglect an essential driving 
force behind the worst international crimes, including genocide.205 Certain contexts indicate 
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situations which undoubtedly warrant the removal of protection from prosecution for speech 
acts. Such contexts include governmentally driven hate narratives, or those of individuals or 
groups with disproportionate societal power coupled with an erosion of effective protection 
from discrimination or violence of the targeted out-group. A further safeguard against over-
criminalization is the necessity to take into account the intent or knowledge of the speaker that 
their words would lead to the elimination, expulsion or other mass violations of human rights 
of the targeted out-group. 
 
The current scope of international criminalization does not indicate an overly intrusive attitude 
to hate propaganda; rather it is too restrictive, if anything. The jurisprudence of the ad hoc 
tribunals has confirmed that purely speech acts can constitute CAH-persecution per se or can 
amount to secondary participation in any CAH through for example incitement or instigation. 
Applying the test set out in Tadić for CAH, such speech has to take place in the context of an 
armed conflict. Unfortunately this excludes by default hate propaganda preceding armed 
conflict and does not allow for the preventative function of the law. Furthermore it is still 
unclear whether according to current jurisprudence hate speech without a direct call for 
violence could amount to CAH-persecution. Such a possibility has to exist if criminalization is 
to cover all hate propaganda leading to mass crimes in the entirety of its complex 
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